Краткая история кипрского государства, с греческокиприотской/левой точки зрения. Комментарии слегка балансируют. Интересно, на мой взгляд, для понимания тамошних страстей. Внутри политические расклады те же, что и в этом анализе (via nameless__one)
11. What is even more absurd is that this is not a bail-in of Depositors of Bank A to rescue Bank A, but a bail-in of Depositors of Banks A-Z to rescue Depositors [and shareholders! - mi_b] of Bank A (Laiki), B (Bank of Cyprus) and C (maybe some small amounts to the others).
This is one of the reasons that the Russians are howling mad. There are 3B dollars of Russian money in a subsidiary of VTB in Cyprus, a perfectly solvent Russian bank. As far as I can tell, they will be haircut in order to bail out Laiki, a bank that they never deposited money in. On the contrary, the depositors in Laiki’s branches in Greece (aka a totally insolvent bank in a much more insolvent sovereign) will not be haircut.
There is no conceivable creditor prioritization in which this makes sense nor does it teach you anything about moral hazard or fairness. In fact, the only thing it might teach you is: “only put deposits in countries that control their Central Bank” because there is no logic or analysis that could have predicted ex ante that a depositor in VTB-Cyprus was more likely to be haircut than a depositor in Laiki-Greece (the latter being 100x more risky than the former).
Даже неудачная попытка такого грубого нарушения старшинства инструментов Европе будет еще не раз аукаться.